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The Commons And The
New Age of Laissez Faire1
Roger A. Lohmann, Ph.D.
West Virginia University
Introduction
We are currently knee-deep in a rather peculiar restoration in
American public life – one that has tremendous implications for
the future of nonprofit organization, voluntary action and
philanthropy. As recently as two decades ago “nineteenth century
individualism” and the doctrine of laissez faire were presented in
our public schools and colleges as anachronisms – simplistic
foibles from an innocent past transcended by the inevitable
advance of progress and the growth of society. (Reisman, 19XX)
Many social scientists – probably including many futurists –
would still adhere to this view.
Yet, here we are on the verge of not only a new century but also a
new millennium, and, laissez faire , the doctrine of
noninterference in the affairs of others, which finds expression in
ideas of individual entrepreneurship, rugged individualism, the
sanctification of capital, the monism of the marketplace and the
doctrine that freedom is primarily an economic, not a political,
concern has once again become the de facto vocabulary of a
broad segment of American public life. One of the principal
characteristics of the emergence of this new laissez faire is the
way in which it has moved nonprofit organizations, voluntary
action, philanthropy and other community institutions off the
public agenda and out of public rhetoric.
This shift in public discourse has occurred at the end of the Cold
War when the United States has emerged as the dominant
superpower in the new world order, so that what is said (and not
said) in American public debate is heard around the world. Even
those who disagree strongly with this new resurgence of
individualism are forced to take note.
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I’m not here today to debate the pros and cons of the return of
laissez faire to the American public agenda or to promote any
alternative visions of the welfare state, big government,
collectivism or communitarianism. My only concern is to point
out that laissez faire visions of the future being promoted today
are dangerously limited in at least one important respect: They
omit any reference to nonprofit organizations, voluntary action or
philanthropy (along with sustaining reference groups like family
and support and friendship groups) as operative parts of the
future. Instead, they offer an altogether familiar bi-polar social
universe from the past composed of “the state” (a.k.a. “big
government”) and “the individual” (which appears to include such
fictive “individuals” as Fortune 500 corporations). In some
alternate versions, this new laissez-faire may also find a place for
“state and local government” in contast to the “big” (that is,
federal) government.
The one thing new laissez faire rhetoric seldom does is find any
place for broader visions of civil society, and in particular,
nonprofit organizations, voluntary action, or philanthropy which
have been such important parts of the American past.
Two Visions of Democracy
There have in fact always been not one, but two distinct, visions
of democracy and the open society active in the American
context, each with many variations: On the one hand, there is the
liberal individualist vision which draws its sustenance largely
from Hobbes and Locke and the English utilitarians. In an
important subset of this liberal individualism running from
Benthamite utilitarianism through the Austrian School, economic
freedoms (entrepreneurship and free trade) are treated as the
ultimate measures of a free world.
On the other hand, sources as diverse as Alexis deTocqueville,
Frank Lloyd Wright and John Dewey have accentuated more
pluralistic and communitarian visions of free societies.
Tocqueville has long been recognized for his insights on the role
of voluntary associations as intermediate institutions between the
coercive powers of the state and the freedom of the individual
citizen. A half-century ago, Wright's Broadacre City and Usonian
House emerged as profoundly important influences on the built
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environment of contemporary urbanism. (Rosenbaum, 1993;
Sergeant, 1976) Much of what is disparaged as “liberal” in
contemporary political rhetoric bears some connection to the
pragmatic liberalism first articulated by Dewey.
The resurgent rhetoric of laissez faire individualism in American
public life has driven discussion of such “collective” or
“cooperative” concerns as nonprofit organizations, voluntary
action and philanthropy completely out of the realm of public
issues, and resulted in the spread of a highly skewed conception
of communities as consisting only of home, work and school.
Such familar institutions as churches, synagogues and mosques,
neighborhoods, clubs, societies, organizations, social service,
fund raising, volunteering, are omitted from new laissez faire
discussions of community, which is treated solely in terms of
work, home and school.
This is not primarily a directional, or politically motivated,
critique: Indeed, the last major public image of this sort may well
have been George Bush’s “Thousand Points of Light” which
emphasized volunteering. Conservative and liberal nonprofit
institutions, voluntary associations, philanthropic organizations
and political organizations are equally absent from the newlaissez
faire visions of the future: the Heritage Foundation as well as the
Brookings Institution; the Christian Coalition and the National
Council of Churches; the Republican Party as well as the
Democrats. What is important here is not any ideological bias but
a pervasive silence.

We-Groups
My critique is directional, however, in that I am largely
uninterested in the nonprofit benefactories – those tax-exempt
nonprofit service corporations – that increasingly draw the main
body of attention by those interested in "the third sector". My
principal interest is, instead, in the commons – those clubs,
congregations, membership organizations, self-help and support
groups, peer- and friendship groups and other “we-groups”. Such
entities, characterized by uncoerced participation, shared purposes
and resources, mutuality and indigenous standards of fairness are,
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in my view, fundamental expressions of human plurality and
basic to human freedom. (Lohmann, 1992)
I do not intend to suggest that the new laissez faire rhetoric of
today means that President Clinton or Speaker Gingrich, or Ross
Perow or any of the manifold other American public figures from
whom we regularly hear it are ignorant of these commons or
believe there will be no nonprofit organizations, voluntary action
or philanthropy in our future. No political figure, even an
exceptionally wealthy one, can expect to carry on for long without
volunteers and donations!
What is truly remarkable, however, is the distinctive way in
which the new laissez faire is characterized by an impoverished
public rhetoric in which community institutions other than home,
school and work simply do not appear. There is remarkably little
mention in public discourse today of clubs and associations,
congregations, museums, theaters, social services, civic groups,
foundations or any of the manifold other nonprofit organizations,
voluntary associations and philanthropic institutions which are
regarded around the world as one of the distinctive marks of
American Civilization.
Yet, the new laissez fair has banished them from public
discourse. Contemporary expressions of the influence of the new
laissez faire on a diminished sense of the commons and common
goods are easy to locate. Indeed, it is the wide and rapid spread
of this feeble vision of the future American community which is
one of its most interesting features. It can be found (or rather, not
found) in just about any contemporary public expression: in such
diverse places as the Republican Party’s Contract for America,
(Gingrich, 1995); a speech by the Director of the Futurist society
in Michigan (Glazer, 1995); Clinton Administration proposals for
the National Information Infrastructure; an interesting and
farsighted economic development document entitled Blue Print
for a 21st Century Community, (Joint Venture: Silicon Valley ,
1994) recent presentations to this society and even works by the
head of the communitarian political movement in the U.S.
(Etzioni, 1993)
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“Contract For America”
It is hard to remember a single document drafted by elected public
officials which has had more immediate and dramatic impact that
the Republican Contract for America in 1994. In a cynical age
when “political” writing by public officials consists mostly of
leaked staff memos, ghost-written campaign biographies fine
tuned to the issues of a particular campaign and memoirs
emphasizing the “kiss and tell” peccadilloes of the subject, it is
hard to think of another statement of political objectives and
intentions quite like the Contract. For this reason alone, its
vision of the commons should be of interest – if it contained one.
The text of the Contract contains no direct or indirect references
to political parties, citizenship or community action, civil society
and it certainly contains no references to community or
commonwealth or the larger body of apolitical nonprofit
organizations, voluntary associations or philanthropic institutions
(not even that marvel of modern political philanthropy, the
political action committee, or PAC). The reasons for such an
obvious omission are open to several possible interpretations.
Fortunately, we may be able to get some help in interpreting it
from one of the authors.
In the current issue of The Futurist, one of the leading architects
of the Contract, House Speaker Newt Gingrich, articulates his
vision of “an opportunity society” which would, he suggests,
represent a “renewed American Civilization” and a replacement
for the American “welfare state.” (Gingrich, 1995) Gingrich
appropriates Tocqueville’s Democracy in America as his primary
source to identify what he labels the “collection of values,
principles, habits and institutions (which) could be grouped
together as ‘American Civilization’”. Yet, among those defining
values, he mentions only “free enterprise in a free market,
entrepreneurship, productivity, incentives and the work ethic,
citizenship, the rule of law, the right to free speech and free
elections.” Tocqueville’s seminal comments on associations in
America and the role of voluntary association as intermediate
between the individual and state are not mentioned.
In fact, in the Gingrich Futurist article, there is but a single,
incidental reference to third sector institutions of any type. He
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notes that “such a transformation (that is, a balanced budget
together with a redefinition of government) would require a deep
shift in popular thinking about the role of the federal government
compared with the roles of the citizen, voluntary associations
(including religious institutions), private business, and local and
state government.” Given the important roles which voluntary
associations, including religious institutions, have played in
American public life during the past century, and the kind of
absence of any mention in Gingrich’s (and other new laissez
faire) works, one can only ask whether such a redefinition
involves simply writing voluntary organization out of the public
equation altogether.
The answer, paradoxical as it may seem, appears to be “yes.”
One of the things that make the new laissez-faire of Gingrich and
others especially interesting is its paradoxical – even self-denying
– connection to the claim that a new “Third Wave” civilization is
emerging. In the immediate past issue of The Futurist, for
example, Alvin and Heidi Toffler write “we are living through the
birth pangs of a new civilization whose institutions are not yet in
place. A fundamental skill needed by policy-makers, politicians
and politically active citizens today – if they really want to know
what they are doing – is, therefore, the ability to distinguish
between proposals designed to keep the tottering Second Wave
system on life-support from those that ease the growth of the next,
Third Wave, civilization.” (Toffler and Toffler, 1995)
One might concede their claims that a new “Third Wave”
civilization is emerging to replace the old industrial order and that
it is advisable that barriers to the new civilization be removed,
rather than, for example, asking the new order to test its mettle by
overcoming those barriers. In making such concessions, however,
it seems fair to ask, whether the kind of laissez-faire, atomistic
individualism, which sees life as, consisting only of home, work
and school is not, itself, one of those barriers?
World Future Society
At a previous conference, for example, John Vasconcellos, a
California state assemblyman and keynote speaker at the
conference said, "All U.S. institutions are 'in terrible dysfunction.'
(Note the word “all.”) In clarifying his point, Vasconcellos said,
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“These include families, schools, the health-care and criminal
justice systems, and governments." Three conclusions seem
plausible: The author, an elected public official in a large urban
state, is unaware of third sector. Third sector institutions are so
inconsequential they are not worthy of mention. Or, third sector
institutions are not among those in terrible dysfunction, and
therefore, presumably worth looking at as part of any plausible
solution.
William E. Halal, professor of management at George
Washington Univ., echoed a familiar “third wave” theme in his
claim that we are witnessing "the collapse of the Industrial Age
model of institutions" which posit that centrally planned
bureaucracies can be trusted to solve our problems." In a classical
new laissez faire leap, "What's needed, said Halal, is for
institutions to put the ideals of democratic free enterprise into
practice. For example, some corporations are establishing
internal markets, and parents, teachers, and local citizens in
Chicago are elected to run their own schools."
The message here is clear: private action is market action. This
central message of the new laissez faire effectively defines the
third sector out of existence. All voluntary behavior other than
profit seeing and consumption is irrational and inefficient, all
donative and philanthropic behavior is suspect.
“The Future of Michigan”
The new laissez-faire is not only operative in national political
rhetoric. One also finds that it has a strong influence upon
economic development discussions – particularly as those
discussions focus on the future of electronic technology.
In April of this year, I presented a paper at a conference on the
application of information technology to nonprofits at Michigan
State University. The keynote speaker who kicked off the
conference was a futurist and executive director of a nonprofit
organization called Michigan Futures, Inc. He presented a
detailed and elegant vision of the future impact of computers in
the homes, communities and companies of what is still one of the
nation’s largest industrial states.
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I was more interested, however, in what he didn’t say than what
he did. Keep in mind, he was presenting to a conference on
computers and nonprofit organizations, attended by
approximately 200 staff, board members and volunteers
associated with local, regional and statewide nonprofit
organizations in Michigan. Yet, the speech contained nothing
about the future impact of computers on churches, synagogues,
mosques, human service agencies, membership associations, civic
clubs, private colleges or any other known or recognizable
nonprofit organizations, voluntary associations or philanthropic
activities. He didn’t mention any potential implications for civic
friendship or citizenship. He didn’t refer to the revolutionary
impact computer data bases are already having on fund-raising, or
the potential they have for community organizing. His references
to the information superhighway (a.k.a., the National Information
Infrastructure) made no mention of the attempts by the Network
for Civic Computing and others to generate discussion of the
future role for an electronic commons.
The conclusion seems unmistakable: In the view of this informed
futurist, there is no future worth commenting on when it comes to
the commons.
Please do not misunderstand me: It was an excellent speech, well
written and well delivered. Indeed, it is in part because of the
author’s command of his subject and his rhetorical
accomplishment that the omissions were so glaring. For what
suddenly struck me was the degree to which the speaker was
presenting the conventional wisdom of American public life
today. I think that conventional wisdom about the future – which
I have already referred to as the new laissez faire – consists of
two important premises:

1.

Communities consist of three domains: home, school and
work.
a.
Work is where people engage in one of the two
central events of life. (Production)
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b.
Home is the place of respite from productive work
(leisure) and the center for the other essential life activity
(consumption).
c.
School is what young people do to prepare for
work. (No preparation for shopping is deemed essential.)
2.
Liberating private initiative from the shackles of public
oppression is the major
I’m not suggesting that people in general have such a narrow,
constricted view of life. I’m saying that in so far as public
officials, business and community leaders today are able to apply
a widely shared “consensus” public ideology to public issues this
seems to be the vision of community it contains. This isn’t the
vision of the future you will hear, of course, at Memorial Day or
4th of July speeches, in sermons, political party caucuses or at the
annual meetings of community organizations should you be one
of the dwindling minority of people still in attendance. It is,
however, the vision you will see peeking through public
discussions of all sorts when people are about other tasks – such
as discussing the role of government or further applications of
computer technology.
“Blue Print for a 21st Century Community”
One of the singularly telling documents on the late 20th century
estimation of the impact of information technology on the
development of society is the report Blue Print for a 21st Century
Community. The Phase II Report issued by an economic
development task force called Joint Venture: Silicon Valley in
June 1993. The report is available on the Internet, and prints out
at 57 pages of 12 pt. Palatino (the same size as the type on this
page).
Based on the title, (an impression supported by the introduction)
you would anticipate that this was to be a comprehensive
planning study of the future of the region in its political, social
and economic multiplicity. You would anticipate also that –
given the title – community would figure prominently in the
presentation.
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Because of the uniquely innovative role of the valley in the
development of the information society, it offers in several
respects a bellwether image of the future. As the report itself says
“No other region in the world can yet match the combination of
our strong entrepreneurial culture, diverse pool of knowledge
workers, or breadth of leading-edge companies.”
The report itself was the product of a task force consisting of
“more than 1,000 business, government and community leaders in
Silicon Valley.” The organization of Silicon Valley, as a 21st
century community if one is to believe the detailed discussions of
the report, will consist only of business, local government,
education and health care.
The most remarkable finding of this report is that the third sector
is completely missing from the vision of the future put forth by
this group. Education is primarily a local government function,
and contemporary health care is a major industry. There is some
inchoate desire within the report, yearning to break free and
provide more fulsome recognition of the real complexity of
community life. It is reflected in subheadings like “The Danger:
Companies Win, Community Loses”. But it never breaks free
into any actual discussion.
Future industry in the valley is seen as divided into seven exportoriented clusters. Four of these – semiconductors, computer/
communications, defense/space and business services – have been
the traditional core of the region. Three others – software,
bioscience and environment – are seen as future emergents.
In a section entitled “Creating the 21st Century Community, we
find echoes of the Toffler, Future Shock rhetoric: “Creating ... a
21st Century Community will require that people, companies, and
organizations work together in new, collaborative ways.” No
details are provided, however, on what such collaborations may
consist of or how they may be organized.
Yet, in what sounds like a curiously second wave rendering,
“community infrastructure” is defined on a subsequent page as
“highly skilled people, advanced telecommunications capacity,
information networks, and other resources” which are “(as)
quality oriented in terms of customer satisfaction, cycle time
reduction, and flexibility as the companies it (sic) supports.” This
10

leads to the admonition that “Only a community in which firms,
institutions, and individuals collaborate easily and effectively can
produce such an infrastructure.”
Communities also have an important public relations value: “To
maintain a high standard of living in a relatively high cost area,
Silicon Valley should have a reputation as a region whose
infrastructure helps companies generate a relatively higher levels
of value. Firms looking for adaptable and responsive community
partners that help provide the foundation for high-value-added
work-including high-skilled workers, fast and efficient regulatory
processes, tax systems that encourages business investment, and a
telecommunications infrastructure that is second to none.”
Approaching the issue of taxes in the post-modern world can be
tricky: “The fundamental problem is that Silicon Valley (as a
community?) is not capturing enough of the value that the
region’s companies are generating.
Dramatic changes in
corporate organization and practices have led to dramatically
higher output per employee in area firms. Even as Silicon Valley
reels from recession, individual companies are doing better than
ever. Earnings and productivity are skyrocketing.”
“A culture of conflict and blame has hurt the ability of the public
and private sectors to work together to solve major problems.
The inability to organize regional assets and build a ‘collaborative
advantage’ through strong working relationships is a major reason
that Silicon Valley has not reached its full potential.”
“As employers and neighbors and parents we are, moreover,
confronted with the reality that key segments of our population –
young people, the lower-skilled – struggle to participate in the
quality of life of our region.
Brain drain, a growing
disenfranchised population, and increasingly difficulty recruiting
new employees to the area have become serious economic and
social issues.”
“The success of a high-performance community must be
measured by increases in the standard of living (real wages and
real per capita income), not simply by job creation or population
growth.”
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“Silicon Valley will be both technology drive and relationship
driven.
Traditionally, Silicon Valley has been primarily
technology driven...Silicon Valley must now be more marketdriven and technology must be rapidly commercialized through a
series of dynamic supplier-customer relationships. In the 21st
Century, Silicon Valley will be the most adept region in the world
in forging relationships necessary for rapid technological
innovation and use.”
“Silicon Valley will enjoy strong connections between its global
companies and its local communities.... Many global firms...are
learning to develop strong relationships in each of the regions
where they operate.”
One of the Joint Venture initiatives was the “Smart Valley”
initiative which “provides a vision of an ‘electronic community’
that brings the full power of information technologies to
fundamentally change the way industry, government and
education work together to create advantage through
collaboration.
The electronic network linking companies,
universities, government agencies, and individuals enables the
Valley to achieve a higher level of productivity and greatly
expanded options for both people and firms in applications
ranging from electronic commerce and distance learning to health
care information.”
“The 21st Century Workforce initiative acts as a catalyst to
connect schools, businesses, and homes into a new learning
system that transcends traditional boundaries.”
“The cost of doing business in the Valley is reduced through the
effective use of information technologies and closer relationships
between business and government. An electronic regulatory
clearinghouse reduces paperwork burdens while wide
dissemination of local performance standards in the permitting
process cuts down on cycle-time delay. The Silicon Valley
Economic Development Team operates ‘smart teams’ to help
identify and reduce barriers to business expansion and retention.”
“Community partners work toward a common set of goals for
higher real incomes, increasing quality of life, and expanding
opportunities. Information technologies invented in the Valley
are now employed to help make this happen. New relationships
12

sustained by information networks enable new levels of
cooperation in addressing education, regulatory, technology and
enterprise challenges.” Among the “key needs” identified by the
report at later points are “an industry ‘voice’ at the regional, state
and federal levels”; a “pro-manufacturing tax structure”;
application of ‘computers/communication technologies to
community problems’ and an ‘industry voice to advocate for
comprehensive tax reform’.
The Third Sector Paradox
Despite its apparently complete blindness to the third sector, “To
begin phase III implementation, the Joint Venture: Silicon Valley
Network has been incorporated as a new nonprofit organization to
sustain the work of specific initiatives and continue to forge
linkages between new and existing community activities.” At a
later point in the report, we learn that “Smart Valley, Inc. is a 501
(c) (6) nonprofit organization governed by an eight-member board
of directions and affiliated with Joint Venture: Silicon Valley
Network.”
The Smart Valley vision of community is somewhat more
expansive: It includes “technology providers, service providers,
applications developers and end users.”
Indirect support for my conclusion that the composition of groups
and the identification of issues accurately reflects the interests of
participants is provided by the following description of the ways
in which the original task structure was expanded: “The
prevalence of telecommunications and networking concerns
among Working Groups led to the creation of a ‘Smart Valley’
information infrastructure group. Concern about the cost of and
access to health care launched a Health Care Task Force. Joint
Venture also created a Diversity Task Force to ensure more
broad-based participation in Industry and Infrastructure Working
Groups.” Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if there were any
genuine sentiment among participants for a more expanded vision
of community, it probably would have resulted in the addition of
other specialized subcommittees directed toward that end.
“The Bay Area is the ideal location to begin the implementation
of the National Information Infrastructure.”
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“The JVSV process helped create or support four specific pilot
projects.” An electronic training network for those already in the
labor force; school-to-work transition for “those about to enter the
work force from high school;”
(drop outs?) a regional
educational clearinghouse for sharing best practices for K-12; and
a Better Learning Through Technology initiative to improve the
use of technology in education.
An “initiative to reduce the cost of doing business” in the Valley
by promoting “an efficient, consistent, and reasonable regulatory
environment while maintaining high safety standards.” It has
three principle foci: regulatory forum, council on tax and fiscal
policy and health care task force.
There is nothing at all unusual about this group. In fact, I picked
it because it is probably typical of the mainline community and
economic development interests in the U.S. today. JVSV
Network board list includes 25 members: Twelve appear to
represent (mostly small) commercial interests. Four members are
identifiably with local government, and two are state
representatives. Two are representatives of higher education and
one is a local school representative. Others represent Labor
Council, Chamber of Commerce, Sierra Club, Economic and
Social Opportunities, Inc., Asian Americans for Community
Development.
National Information Infrastructure
It may not simply be the forms of nonprofit, voluntary and
philanthropic organization that are vetoed by the new laissez
faire. Also suspect are various forms of common goods. This is
clearly illustrated by the way in which the existing “fair use”
doctrine has become a target of proposals to modify the existing
copyright law in the U.S.
A recent analysis in the Chronicle of Higher Education concluded
that "(i)f the publishing and software industries have their way
with the revision of the U.S. Copyright Act, any copying in the
realm of electronic information that is not authorized by the
copyright owner will be illegal.
"While nearly everyone agrees that copyrights need to be
protected from infringement on the emerging information
14

superhighway (formally known as the National Information
Infrastructure) most people are not aware that publishers and
software producers are seeking an absolute monopoly on the right
to digitize, store, and transmit copyrighted information. Once in
complete control of the rights to electronic information, they
intend to offer licenses and contracts that will define the extent to
which information users may (or may not) read, browse, print,
copy, share, lend or retransmit copyrighted works. (Frazier, 1995)
"The legal framework for this seemingly paranoid vision of the
future is clearly outlined in the "Preliminary Report of the
Working Group on Intellectual Property," released in July, 1994
which was produced by the Information Infrastructure Task Force
of the U. S. Department of Commerce...Representatives of the
Clinton Administration have said that the preliminary report is on
the right track.
"(The) report proposes that the copyright holder be given the
exclusive right to 'transmit' a copyrighted work.
"The report also recommends eliminating the 'doctrine of first
sale' for electronic information.
In the world of paper
publications, the doctrine affirms the commonsense notion that,
once bought, a book can be resold, lent, rented or given away
without the permission of the copyright holder.
Finally, so that no one tampers with the security systems of this
brave new information infrastructure, the report proposes that
existing copyright laws be revised to prohibit devices, products
and services that 'defeat technological methods of preventing
unauthorized use."
If It Ain’t Broke, Break It
This approach would, of course, effectively nullify “fair use”
doctrines that currently allow certain forms of copying for
educational and public interest reasons. It would also effectively
eliminate knowledge dissemination and public discourse as
common goods in favor of a laissez faire vision of the
unconditional property rights of the authors and publishers. As an
example, all of the quotations in this presentation are done within
the terms of scholarly fair use. Obtaining explicit permission
from each of the copyright holders in question would have been
an onerous but necessary task.
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There is a maximum irony in this, in that the Internet was
originally created out of what is one of the few genuine, global
public interests – survival of nuclear holocaust. It’s most
successful features – newsgroups, email list servers, MOO’s,
bulletin boards, and most spectacularly, the World Wide Web –
all have the character of commons, rather than markets. That is,
voluntary participation, shared purposes and resources, a strong
sense of mutuality characterize them. While commercial, profitmaking access services (such as Compuserve, AmericaOnLine
and Prodigy) appear to be thriving, to date commercial visions of
what Nicholas von Hoffman calls “electrotainment” have been
notably unsuccessful. (von Hoffman, 1995)
I am not holding this proposal up as a shibboleth: There is little
doubt that such proposals, if passed into law, would prove as
unworkable as 35 mph speed limits on interstate highways, and
would ultimately prove unconstitutional under any sane
interpretation of the First Amendment. I hold them up here
primarily as additional examples of new laissez faire policy
proposals and their tendency to dismiss any aspect of cooperative,
shared, voluntary, collaborative endeavors.
Communitarianism
The resurgence of individualist and entrepreneurial rhetoric in
American public life that I am calling the New Laissez Faire has
proven to be very strong medicine in our era.
The laissez faire influence has been so strong, in fact, that even
communitarians have proven, somewhat paradoxically,
susceptible to its influence, and in particular to its vision of
community as home, work and school. Evidence for this
conclusion can be found, for example, in the article by a leading
communitarian spokesman, the sociologist Amatai Etzioni, in the
November-December, 1993 issue of The Futurist.
In that article, Etzioni sounds a major communitarian theme
which has also been taken up by advocates of the new laissez
faire : "Historians will look back on the 1990's, I believe, and see
them as a period in which the reconstruction of American society
took place...”.
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Etzioni’s preferred reconstruction, however, is quite distinct from
the new laissez faire emphasis on diminishing central government
taxation and regulation: “From a preoccupation with rights,
American society is moving to demand that people shoulder their
responsibilities and pay greater attention to the needs of their
families and communities." Yet, in a curious concession to the
laissez faire view, all of his examples of resurgent “community”
involve the laissez faire formula of either families or schools.
It would be easy to suggest that this is merely a temporary
oversight. However, in a keynote speech to the International
Society for Third Sector Research in Pecs, Hungary last summer,
the absence of all but the most cursory references to third sector
organizations or commons was as evident in Etzioni’s as in the
speech by Glazer noted above. Moreover, examination of the
platform of the communitarian party and Etzioni’s communitarian
manifesto will reveal much the same gaps.
I am currently reviewing the writings of communitarians, and can
note that with a few major exceptions, the vision of community
espoused by communitarians is largely lacking in any attention to
nonprofit organizations, voluntary action or philanthropy.
Explicit references to nonprofit organizations, voluntary action
and philanthropy are conspicuous mostly by their absence from
most communitarian writings.
This trend is paradoxical in at least two distinct ways: First, even
though they may not be recognized, many forms of association
will continue. Secondly, the very absence of recognition is
contributing to dangerous new expressions of organized
alienation, like the militia movement. Thirdly, the growth of
laissez faire in this country is preventing Americans from seeing
one major aspect of the emerging new world order: a “global
associational revolution” in which traditional American values
regarding the political, civil and social importance of voluntary
association and nonprofit organization are being disseminated
throughout the world.
In the age of the new laissez faire, proposals like Harlan
Cleveland’s call in the Futurist for a global commons to supervise
‘the common heritage of mankind’ go largely unheeded.
(Cleveland, 1993)
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"Havel himself mentions the need 'to invent new organizational
structures appropriate to the present multicultural age....
"We can also do far more to encourage a healthy
development of the social sciences, which have given
occasional demonstrations of their power to help us
understand more clearly our psychological and institutional
failings. Up to now, the social sciences have been poorly
supported and often corrupted by ideologies and special
interests, but that could change in the future. A reformed
social science might show us how to overcome many of the
obstacles to cultural understanding and global peace."
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